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Abstract
Properties of unitary time evolution of quantum systems can be applied to define quantum cryptographic protocols.
Dynamics of a qubit can be exploited as a data encryption/decryption procedure by means of timed measurements,
implementation of an open-loop control scheme over a qubit increases robustness of a protocol employing this
principle.
1 Introduction
One of the most prominent practical applications of
quantum information theory is quantum cryptography
[2, 5, 6], in particular the so-called Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) where a transmission of quantum
information (e.g. through polarized photons in an
optical fiber) is used to create a shared key between
two clients. In classical cryptography, if Alice wants
to communicate a secret message x ∈ BN , where
B = {0, 1} and N ∈ N, over a public communication
channel, she can adopt the one-time pad security: She
randomly generates a second bit string y ∈ BN (the
key) and sends x + y to Bob. The receiver who knows
the string y can decrypt the message simply adding y,
the communication is perfectly secure only if the key y
is securely exchanged and manteined secret.
Quantum information processes can be applied to
distribute a secret key in order to use it as a one-time
pad. Information exchange in a quantum channel
prevents eavesdropping attacks exploiting principles of
Quantum Mechanics: An eavesdropper (Eve) cannot
clone an unknown quantum state (no-cloning theorem,
see appendix A) thus she can gain information only
performing measurements on qubits and quantum
effects of these measurements can be detected showing
that used communication channel is not secure.
Mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics can
be derive from a set of postulates that we briefly recall
in order to introduce principles of quantum mechanics
and basic features of quantum systems that are relevant
in the present discussion, in particular we refer to
finite-dimensional case:
i) A complex vector space H with inner product
〈 | 〉 (a Hilbert space) is associated with any quantum
system.
ii) Physical (pure1) states of the considered quantum
system are equivalence classes of unit vectors ψ ∈ H
where ψ ∼ ψ′ iff ψ = eiθψ′ for some θ ∈ R. A unit
vector ψ ∈ H representing a quantum state is called
state vector2.
iii) Time evolution of an isolated system is described by
a continuous one-parameter group of unitary operators
{U(t)}t∈R+ acting on state vectors. If |ψ1〉 is the state
of the system at time t1 and |ψ2〉 is the state of the
system at time t2 > t1 then:
|ψ2〉 = U(t2 − t1)|ψ1〉. (1)
iv) A measurement process on a quantum system is de-
scribed by a collection of positive operators {Ek} satisfy-
ing
∑
k Ek = IH called positive operator-valued measure
(POVM), the index k runs in the set of all possible out-
comes of the measurement, so it is a real number3. The
probability to measure k when the system is in the state
|ψ〉 is:
pψ(k) = 〈ψ|Ekψ〉. (2)
v) If a quantum system is composed by two subsystems
A and B that are respectively described in Hilbert
1There exists a more general notion of quantum state, themixed
state, that is not necessary in our discussion
2We adopt Dirac formalism: A unit vector of the Hilbert space
is denoted by the ket |ψ〉, a vector of dual space is denoted by the
bra 〈ψ|, the inner product of two vectors is denoted by 〈ψ|φ〉, the
outer product by |ψ〉〈φ|.
3There is a more general notion of POVM that also describes
measurements with a non-discrete set of outcomes [8], it is defined
as a measure on the Borel σ-algebra of R.
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spaces HA and HB, then the total system is described
in the Hilbert space given by the Hilbert space tensor
product HA ⊗ HB.
A special class of POVMs is that of projective
measurements whose elements are orthogonal projectors
Pk, i.e. operators on H satisfying P
∗
k = Pk and P
2
k = Pk.
In this case if the measurement is performed when the
state of the system is |ψ〉 and it produces the outcome
k then the state of the system after the measurement is:
|ψ′〉 = Pk|ψ〉√〈ψ|Pkψ〉 , (3)
and a selfadjoint operator on H, called observable, can
be defined:
A =
∑
k
kPk, (4)
so the possible outcomes of the measurement described
by the POVM {Pk} are the eigenvalues of A. In particu-
lar the selfadjoint operator H describing total energy of
the system, called Hamiltonian, is the generator of the
group {U(t)}t∈R+ , that is the unique (by Stone theorem
[8]) self-adjoint operator such that Ut = exp[−iHt] for
any t ∈ R+.
A classical bit is the basic unit of information and
it can be realized by a physical system which admits
only two states, namely 0 and 1. While a quantum bit
is a two-level quantum system (i.e. it is described in a
two-dimensional Hilbert space) then its general state
|ψ〉 is given by a superposition of two orthogonormal
state vectors that can be denoted by |0〉 and |1〉:
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 α, β ∈ C, (5)
thus the Hilbert space of such quantum system is iso-
morphic to C2. Since state vector |ψ〉 has unit norm, i.e.
|〈ψ|ψ〉|2 = 1, then |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 and the state vector
admits the following angular representation:
|ψ〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ eiϕ sin θ
2
|1〉, (6)
for θ, ϕ ∈ R, so the state of a qubit can be representd on
the so-called Bloch sphere, according to (6) the states |0〉
and |1〉 corresponds to the poles. Postulate ii) reads that
unit vectors differing by a multiplicative phase factor
are physically indistinguishable then (pure) states can
be described by rank-1 orthogonal projectors |ψ〉〈ψ| in a
one-to-one correspondence.
In order to give a physical realization of a quibit one can
consider polarization states of a photon, spin states of an
electron, an atom oscillating between ground state and
a single excited state. Considering the example of the
electron, we denote the spin down state as |0〉 and the
spin up state as |1〉. The measurement process of spin
(e.g. realized in a Stern-Gerlach apparatus) is described
by the projectors:
P0 = |0〉〈0| and P1 = |1〉〈1|. (7)
If the state of the electron is the linear superposition (5)
then the probability to measure spin down (value 0) is
p(0) = 〈ψ|0〉〈0|ψ〉 = |α|2 and the probability to measure
spin up (value 1) is p(1) = 〈ψ|1〉〈1|ψ〉 = |β|2. After the
measurement the state of the electron is |0〉 if the out-
come of measurement is 0, while after the measurement
the state is |1〉 if the measured value is 1. Generally
speaking one can map states |0〉 and |1〉 into classical bit
states 0 and 1 during a measurement.
2 Basic control scheme of a qubit
The control scheme discussed in this section is open-loop,
this means the control law is designed and completely
determined before the experiment and then used without
modification during the experiment [3].
Consider a two-level quantum system (qubit) described
by the Hamiltonian:
H = H0 + u1(t)H1(t) + u2(t)H2(t) t ∈ [0, T ], (8)
where H0 represents the internal energy of the system,
u1 = u1(t) and u2 = u2(t) are control functions defined
on the real interval [0, T ], H1 andH2 are time-dependent
Hamiltonians describing interaction of the system with
external fields.
The control function u1 and u2 are defined piecewise as
follows: Let {[tn−1, tn]}n=1,...,N , with 0 = t0 < t1 <
· · · < tN = T , be a partition of [0, T ] into N ∈ N subin-
tervals, for any n = 1, ..., N the control functions are
given by:
u1(t) := bn ∈ B = {0, 1} ∀t ∈ [tn−1, tn], (9)
u2(t) := 1− u1(t). (10)
Thus u1 and u2 are piecewise constant function com-
pletely determined by a vector in BN which defines a
time sequence of non-overlapping control pulses. This
structure also implies that the control of the system is
attuated turning on and off the external fields according
to a suitable time sequence (bang-bang control).
Time evolution of the controlled system is described by
the solution U = U(t) of the operatorial Schro¨dinger
equation:
i~
d
dt
U(t) =

H0 + ∑
i=1,2
ui(t)Hi(t)

U(t), (11)
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with initial condition U(0) = I2. If the state of the
system is |ψ0〉 at time t = 0 then at time t = T the
system is in the final state |ψf 〉 = U(T )|ψ0〉. Hence a
certain time evolution (and in particular a certain final
state) can be achieved4 acting on the controls u1, u2, i.e.
choosing a suitable sequence (b1, ..., bN ) ∈ BN of control
pulses.
The control sequence to achieve the desired evolution
corresponds to a factorization of the unitary operator
U(T ). Adopting the interaction picture, solution of (11)
is U(t) = U0(t)UI(t) where U0(t) = exp[−i/~H0t] is the
evolution operator of the free system. The interaction
component UI satisfies the equation:
i~
d
dt
UI(t) = U
∗
0 (t)

∑
i=1,2
ui(t)Hi(t)

U0(t)UI(t), (12)
as the direct calculation shows (see appendix B). UI(t),
with t ∈ [tn−1, tn], can be factorize as follows:
UI(t) = Vn(t)UI(tn−1), (13)
where the operator Vn is obatined integrating equation
(12):
Vn(t) = exp

− i
~
∫ t
tn−1
U∗0 (τ)

∑
i=1,2
ui(τ)Hi(τ)

U0(τ)dτ

=
= exp
[
− i
~
∫ t
tn−1
U∗0 (τ) (bnH1(τ)+
+(1− bn)H2(τ))U0(τ)dτ ] . (14)
Iterating on the total interval this elementary factoriza-
tion we can write the decomposition of the desired uni-
tary operator U(T ):
U(T ) = U0(T )UI(T ) = exp
[
− i
~
H0T
]
VNVN−1 · · ·V1 (15)
where
Vn = exp
[
− i
~
∫ tn
tn−1
U∗0 (t) (bnH1(t)+
+(1− bn)H2(t))U0(t)dt] . (16)
Generally speaking, factorization of a unitary operator
into a product of generators of dynamical Lie group de-
termines the sequence of control pulses to achieve a tar-
get evolution, then it is a strategy of constructive quan-
tum control, as widely explained in [9].
4In general not all states can be achieved from an initial state
in a finite time and a reachable set can be defined.
In the following we will be interested to drive back the
system from the final state |ψf 〉 to the initial one |ψ0〉,
this procedure is mathematically described by the ap-
plication of the adjoint evolution operator U∗(T ) to the
final state, this is given by:
U∗(T ) = U∗I (T )U
∗
0 (T ) = V
∗
1 · · ·V ∗N exp
[
i
~
H0T
]
, (17)
where
V ∗n = V
−1
n = exp
[
i
~
∫ t
tn−1
U∗0 (t) (bnH1(t)+
+(1− bn)H2(t))U0(t)dt] . (18)
If a qubit state is decomposed in the basis of eigenvectors
|0〉 and |1〉 of H0 (let E0 and E1 be the corresponding
eigenvalues), |ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 then the action of opera-
tor U0(T ) (or U
∗
0 (T )) only produces relative phases:
exp
[
± i
~
H0T
]
|ψ〉 = αe± i~E0T |0〉+ βe± i~E1T |1〉, (19)
which do not affect the probabilities |α|2 and |β|2 to
measure values E0 and E1 respectively. We say that |ψ〉
is equal to U0(T )|ψ〉 up to relative phases implying the
two states are indistinguishable by means of a measure-
ment process described by projectors P0 = |0〉〈0| and
P1 = |1〉〈1|.
Thus from (17) and (18) it is clear that in order
to re-obtain the initial state (up to relative phases
due to drift term H0) of the system from |ψf 〉 in a
time interval [τ, τ + T ] one can switch the sign of the
control fields and set the control sequence (b′1, ..., b
′
N)
defined as b′n := bN+1−n for every n = 1, ..., N . The
(b′1, ..., b
′
N )-controlled dynamics with sign-switched
interaction terms is described by the evolution operator
U0(t)U
∗
I (t) that does not correspond to the adjoint
of U(t) = U0(t)UI(t). However from the point of
view of the projective measurement {P0, P1} these two
evolution operators are indistinguishable as clarified by
the example below.
Remark: In view of further applications, let us
discuss the following example: Let b ∈ BN be a bit
string describing a control sequence for the Hamiltonian
(8) and U(t) = exp[− i
~
Ht] is the associated evolution
operator which can be factorized as U(t) = U0(t)UI(t)
where UI satisfies equation (12). Consider the initial
state |0〉 (eigenstate of free Hamiltonian H0) at time
t0 = 0 and the evolved state |ψ〉 = U(t)|0〉 for some
t ≥ 0. Swhitching the sign of control fields and choosing
the control sequence defined by b′ ∈ BN , the system can
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be driven back from the pure state |ψ〉〈ψ| to the pure
state |0〉〈0| in a time interval of lenght t, as shown by:
U0(t)U
∗
I (t) |ψ〉〈ψ|UI(t)U∗0 (t) = |0〉〈0|, (20)
(See appendix C for a proof of (20)). If the initial
state is not an eigenstate of free Hamiltonian then
the action of U0(t)U
∗
I (t) on the final state does not
produce the initial state but another pure state that
is indistinguishable from the initial one by means of a
measurement described by |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1|.
The model of a qubit controlled by a series of control
pulses in the bang-bang scenario described above admits
an immediate physical realization in terms of a half-spin
particle interacting with an external magnetic field.
In this case control pulses are actually implemented
in time, on the other hand if the qubit is realized by
a photon the control pulses are implemented in space
rather than in time by means of passive optical ele-
ments. Regarding applicability, photons are an effective
solution for long-distance quantum communications
[5]. Therefore let us discuss an analogue model that is
convenient for physical realizations with photons.
Consider a two-level quantum system described by the
Hamiltonian with time-independent coupling terms:
H = σz + u1(t)σx + u2(t)σy , (21)
where σx,y,z are the Pauli matrices :
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, (22)
σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
,
and the control functions u1 and u2 are defined as before
in (9) and (10). Thus the final state after the evolution
governed by (21) in a partitioned time interval [0, T ] is
given applying to the initial state the unitary operator:
U(T ) = e−iσzTV1 · · ·VN , (23)
where:
Vn = exp[−i(bnσx + (bn − 1)σy)∆t]. (24)
and ∆t = tn − tn−1. Thus the open-loop control
law of the qubit is individuated again by a bit-string
(b1, ..., bn) ∈ BN like in the above analysis.
A possible physical realization of the quantum system
with Hamiltonian (21) is a half-spin particle in a mag-
netic field with time varying components in the x and y
directions, while the free motion is the Larmor preces-
sion around z-axis. A control sequence bn determines
which component of the magnetic field is active within
time interval [tn−1, tn] then it corresponds to a sequence
of rotations on the Bloch sphere around x and y axes,
as shown in (23) and (24), whose angles depends on the
amplitude of intervals {[tn−1, tn]}n=1,...,N .
If the physical system is a linearly polarized photon cir-
culating in a ring cavity then |0〉 and |1〉 represent the
states of horizontal and vertical polarization respectively.
The control pulses are implemented in space by means
of passive elements on the photon path. The very short
time of flight of the photon inside the optical elements
implies that one of these elements can be modeled as
a control pulse with a very narrow envelope. Opera-
tors exp[−iϕσx] and exp[−iϕσy] with ϕ ∈ [0, 2pi] can be
experimentally implemented by a suitable oriented dis-
persive wave retarder where ϕ is the phase accumulated
by the photon after a single passage through the optical
element [7]. Then the operator Vn defined in (24) can
be realized putting a dispersive element on the photon
path during the time interval [tn−1, tn], this corresponds
to an integer number q of cycles in the optical cavity
producing an angle qϕ:
Vn =
{
exp[−i(qϕ)σx] for bn = 1
exp[−i(qϕ)σy ] for bn = 0 . (25)
Indeed Vn does not describe the action of a single control
pulse applied in [tn−1, tn] but a series of q very narrow-
size control pulses. In order to obtain the inverse dy-
namics one has to consider the adjoint of above operator
that is given by:
V ∗n = V
−1
n =
{
σyVnσy for bn = 1
σzVnσz for bn = 0
, (26)
and then it can be realized by means of optical elements
(wave-plates) acting on polarization states as Pauli ma-
trices (that are the simplest quantum gates).
Free dynamics inside the cavity corresponds to a phase-
noise along z-axis produced by cavity mirrors, in a trian-
gular cavity (three cavity mirrors) the polarization trans-
formation during a time interval [0, T ] is:
U0(T ) = exp[−ip(3Φ)σz], (27)
where Φ is the relative phase due to a single mirror and p
is the number of round trips in the interval [0, T ]. There-
fore we recover the factorized operator (23) in the photon
setting.
3 Dynamical protocol
In this section we present some ideas to implement se-
cure transmission of data or a cryptographic key over a
public channel exploiting the properties of unitary time
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evolution of quantum systems.
We can classify quantum cryptographic protocols in
two main categories: Preparation/measurement proto-
cols (like BB84 [1]) and entanglement-based protocols
(like E91 [4]). Let us propose a third kind of protocols
which we call dynamical protocols, where data encryp-
tion/decryption procedures are realized by means of dy-
namics of a quantum system. Assume two parties (Alice
and Bob) have choosen a computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}
fixing two orthonormal states of a quantum system de-
scribed in a bi-dimensional Hilbert space. Suppose Alice
wants to send the classical bit 0 to Bob, she does not
transmit the qubit in the state |0〉 but she can trans-
mit the qubit in the evolved state |ψ〉t = U(t)|0〉, where
U(t) = exp[−iHt] is the evolution operator induced by
the Hamiltonian H (~ = 1). Therefore quantum dynam-
ics gives rise to an encryption of datum to be transmit-
ted. The secret datum can be decrypted applying U∗(t)
which represents another time evolution of the qubit af-
ter quantum trasmission, as illustrated in the next sec-
tion where the above control scheme will be applied.
Let us discuss the simplest architecture based on the no-
tion of quantum evolution as encryption which can be re-
alized with a non-controlled isolated system. Suppose a
qubit is confined in an experimental apparatus called Al-
ice’s slot (it can be a photon circulating in a ring cavity or
a half-spin particle in a magnetic trap) and it is described
by the time-independent Hamiltonian H . There is also
a Bob’s apparatus that is a copy of Alice’s slot such that
the quibit can be trasnmitted from Alice to Bob over
a quantum channel that is assumed to be noiseless, i.e.
quantum states are transmitted unaltered. Assume |0〉
and |1〉 are the eigenstates of H and the computational
basis for the information processing is given by the states
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉) representing
classical bits 1 and 0 respectively, if the qubit is prepared
in |+〉 at time t = 0 then its dynamics is described by:
|ψ〉t = e−iHt|+〉 = 1√
2
(
e−iE0t|0〉+ e−iE1t|1〉) (28)
for t > 0, then the probability to measure 1 during the
evolution is:
P1(t) = |〈+|ψ〉t|2 = 1
4
∣∣eiE0t + eiE1t∣∣2 . (29)
The non-negative roots of (29) are τn =
(2n+1)pi
E1−E0 with
n ∈ Z+ then P0(τn) = 1, where P0 is the probability to
measure the value 0.
A dynamical protocol can be summarized as follows:
Step 1 (Preparation). If Alice wants to send the
classical bit 0 (represneted by |−〉) to Bob, she prepares
the qubit in the evolved state |ψ〉τ = exp[−iHτ ]|+〉
obtaining an encrypted datum.
Step 2 (Quantum communication). Alice transmits the
qubit in |ψ〉τ over a quantum channel.
Step 3 (Classical communication). Over a classical
public channel Alice declares the time T1 at which Bob
must perform the measurement on the received qubit.
After quantum transmission the qubit evolves in
the Bob’s slot according to evolution operator
U(t) = exp[−iHt]. The measurement time t = T1
is choosen by Alice such that the state of qubit when
Bob performs the measurement is |ψ〉τn which differs
from |−〉 by a phase factor, i.e. the probability to
measure 0 on |ψ〉τn is 1. In other words if the quibit is
received by Bob at time T0 then Alice selects T1 so that
τ +(T1−T0) = τn. Otherwise if Alice wants to transmit
the classical bit 1 then she declares a measurement time
T ′1 so that τ + (T
′
1 − T0) = τ ′n where {τ ′n}n∈Z are time
values such that P1(τ
′
n) = 1, i.e. the non-negative roots
of P0(t) = |〈−|ψ〉t|2.
Thus the state |ψ〉τ can be used to encrypt both classi-
cal bits 0 and 1. Only the value of T1 in the classical
communication discriminates if decryption procedure in
Bob’s slot gives 0 or 1.
About unconditional security of such simple protocol,
since an unknown quantum state is impossible to clone
(see appendix A) the only way to decrypt the quantum
information is implementing time evolution of the qubit
according to H and performing the measurement at time
communicated by the sender. An eavesdropper (Eve)
can intercept the quibit over the quantum channel,
however she must have an exacy copy of Alice and
Bob’s slots to state the right time evolution of the
system. In this case she can intercept the classical data
T1 and decrypt the information, nevertheless she must
re-prepare the qubit in the encrypted state and re-send
it to the receiver in order to hide her attack. Such
eavesdropping attack produces a delay on the quantum
transmission which can be detected by Bob. In fact
if a classical authentication protocol is implemented
over the classical channel in order to ensure that the
right person is at the end of the line then Bob performs
the measure at time T1 discovering no qubit arrives in
his slot. Hence an eavesdropping produces a lack of
information.
If Eve does not re-send qubit in the original state but
she decides to provide a fake qubit to the receiver then
she produces a randomized datum, i.e. the attack is
an error source. During the transmission of a message
or QKD, errors can be detected appending mutually
agreed bit sequences to the message, otherwise an error
estimation and reconciliation procedure can be adopted
on the shared key [5].
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4 Controlled dynamical protocol
Despite theoretical simplicity, the general protocol
described in the previous section is not convenient in
physical realizations, with trapped half-spin particles for
instance, because of high frequencies and susceptibility
to noise of free dynamics. In this section a basic
open-loop quantum control scheme is applied to define
a dynamical protocol in order to obtain a significant
robustness w.r.t. the general structure described above.
In this section we want to define a protocol of quantum
communication (which can be applied also for a QKD)
exploiting the controlled dynamics of a qubit. The main
idea is setting up a quantum communication where a
qubit in an arbitrary superposition state α|0〉 + β|1〉
is sent representing an encrypted information, before
quantum transmission the sender tells to the receiver
how to control qubit dynamics to achieve |0〉 or |1〉
in a selected time interval. After controlled evolution
(decryption) the receiver can perform a measurement.
Let us describe how our protocol works: The com-
munication system is made by Alice’s slot where the
qubit is described by the Hamiltonian (8) and the Bob’s
slot where the interaction term in the Hamiltonian is
sign-switched. The slots are equipped with synchronized
clocks and a default time interval [0, T ] partitioned in
N subintervals {[ti−1, ti]}i=1,...,N is a priori fixed.
The scheme below shows the steps of the protocol:
Step 1 (Encryption). Alice prepares a qubit in
the state |0〉 (or |1〉) e.g. performing a projective
measurement, this is the information she wants to
send. Then she randomly generate a bit-string in BN
representing a control sequence (b1, ..., bN). She sets the
controlled evolution for an arbitrary time interval [0, T ′]
with T ′ = tm < tN = T obtaining the encrypted datum
|ψ〉 = U(T ′)|0〉.
Note the sub-string (b1, ..., bm) ∈ Bm (i.e. the values
of control function u = u(t) for t < tm) is sufficient to
drive the system from |0〉 to |ψ〉 in the time T ′.
Step 2 (Classical communication): Using a classical
communication channel Alice sends to Bob the pair
(T0, b
′) ∈ R × BN where b′ ∈ BN is the suitable control
sequence for Bob defined as follows:
b′i := bm+1−i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
b′i := Rand(B) for m < i ≤ N.
The bits bi, for i > m, are randomly taken because
are not relevant to implement the unitary operation
required for decryption. T0 is the receiving time of
quantum transmission, i.e. when the qubit arrives in
Bob’s slot and the controlled evolution according to b′
can start.
Step 3 (Quantum communication): Alice sends the
qubit in the state |ψ〉 to Bob over the quantum channel
according to timing information sent in the previous
step. Then at time T0 controlled evolution of the qubit
starts in Bob’s slot.
Step 4 (Decryption): Alice tells Bob when per-
forming a measurement on qubit. Datum T1 is
transmitted over a classical channel. Bob follows
the instructions received on classical channel per-
forming a measuremnt when the qubit state is
U0(T1 − T0)U∗I (T1 − T0)|ψ〉 = U0(T ′)U∗I (T ′)|ψ〉 that
correspond to |0〉 up to a multiplicative phase factor.
Let us remark why the encryption procedure has
not stated exploiting the whole interval [0, T ] to control
system dynamics and why preparing quibit in the state
|ψ〉 = U(T )|0〉 is a naive strategy. In this case, an
eavesdropper (Eve) could explicitely obtain the operator
U(T ) from the classical message of Step 1 solving
equation (12). Thus she would know that the qubit
is in the state |ψ〉 = U(T )|0〉 or |ϕ〉 = U(T )|1〉, she
would be able to perform a measurement w.r.t. the new
orthonormal basis {|ψ〉, |ϕ〉} gaining information and
re-sending the qubit to Bob in the original state, giving
place to a perfectly hidden eavesdropping. For this
reason a time sub-interval is adopted, however fixing
total interval is crucial to well-define a control sequence.
An eavesdropper, with an exact copy of Alice and Bob’s
slots, can attack the communication process with a
woman-in-the-middle strategy playing the Bob’s part
for Alice and the Alice’s part for Bob. To avoid this fact
a classical authentication protocol must be implemented
over the classical channel in order to ensure that the
right person is at the end of the line [5]. Classical
authentication is a typical device of QKD protocols
adopting also classical communications like celebrated
BB84 [1] and E91 [4].
If Eve intercepts the classical message gaining control
sequence b′ ∈ BN and receiving time T0, she can inter-
cept the qubit implementing the controlled evolution
at time T ∗0 ( T
∗
0 6= T0 is the right receiving time for
Eve depending on the receiving time T0 for Bob, let
us suppose Eve knows ∆T = T0 − T ∗0 because of
her deep knowledge of the quantum channel). Then
she intercepts the second classical communication
gaining T1 so she performs the measurement at time
T ∗1 = T1 − ∆T completing decryption phase in her
copy of Bob’s slot. Since she cannot copy an unknown
quantum state the only way to re-transmit the original
qubit state to Bob is implementig the whole decryption
phase and re-prepare the qubit. Then Bob will receive
the qubit with a time delay τ > T ′. The presence of
delay in quantum transmission and consequent lack of
6
information proves an eavesdropping attack occured.
If Eve wants to prevent a time delay the only thing she
can do is sending a qubit in a new arbitrary state to
Bob who would receive a quibit at expected time T0
but this produces a random bit (error) which can be
detected appending mutually agreed bit sequences to
the message, otherwise an error estimation procedure
can be adopted on the shared key after a QKD with our
protocol. Every eavesdropping without delay produces
randomized incoming qubits in Bob’s slot, i.e. it is
always an error source5.
Let us summarize a general eavesdropping attack
assuming Eve has an exact copy of Bob’s slot and a
synchrnonized clock with clients’ clocks:
Stage 1 Eve intercepts the classical message, gaining
instructions about decryption: Initial time T0 of con-
trolled evolution and control sequence b ∈ BN .
Stage 2 She moves an intercept-and-resend attack
over the quantum channel. She implements decryption
procedure on the intercepted qubit performing a mea-
surement at time T1 declared by Alice in the second
classical communication. She gains secret information
sent by Alice. In the third stage Eve must take a
decision between two possible strategies.
Stage 3(a) She reprepares the qubit in the original
state and resends it to Bob. Time duration of this
procedure implies the qubit is not in Bob’s slot when
he performs the measurement at time T1. Thus Eve
produces a time delay corresponding to an information
disappearance.
Stage 3(b) During decryption phase in Eve’s slot, she
provides a fake qubit to Bob according to expected
receiving time in order to hide her presence. Bob’s
implements decryption and performs the measurement
obtaining a completely randomized outcome.
An effective eavesdropping attack can achieve the
secret information however it certainly produces indeli-
ble marks revealing Eve’s presence. More precisely if the
information is intercepted then there is no way to resend
it to Bob in order to maintain an eavesdropper hidden.
For this reason the presented protocol is particularly
effective for quantum key distribution. If Eve adopts the
startegy of Stage 3(b) during QKD then Alice’s key and
Bob’s key do not match because they are completely
scorrelated by Eve’s fake qubits.
We can slightly generalized the protocol from transmis-
sion of a single qubit to transmission of a qubit-string.
Suppose Alice wants to send a qubit k-string in the
5While in BB84 an eavesdropping attack produces randomized
qubits only if Eve chooses a different measurement basis w.r.t. to
Alice and Bob [1] otherwise transmission is unperturbed.
state:
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ · · · (30)
the encryption is implemented controlling the evolution
of qubits in a selected time interval [0, T ′], i.e. applying
U⊗k(T ′) to (30) obtaining the encrypted string:
|ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ · · · (31)
where |ψ〉 = U(T ′)|0〉 and |φ〉 = U(T ′)|1〉. The quantum
transmission is characterized by ∆t that is the time in-
terval between the transmissions of a single qubit and the
following one in the string. Bob receives control sequence
and T0 over the classical channel. Bob will activate the
control sequence at time T0 and he will start to mea-
sure single qubits at time T1 repeating measurements at
T1 + l∆t for l = 1, ..., k − 1. Hence a qubit-string with
arbitrary lenght can be encrypted with the same amount
of classical information.
5 Conclusions
In the present work a general open-loop scheme to con-
trol a single qubit is discussed with some hints about
physical realizations. Then the scheme with two control
functions is proposed to define a quantum cryptographic
protocol where controlled dynamics of qubit (or a string
of qubits) gives rise to an encryption procedure and the
values of controls are transmitted in a classical commu-
nication. In particular the control law is encoded in a
bit-string, called control sequence, that contains a re-
dundant information. Decryption can be implemented
by the receiver once known the control sequence and the
time at which he must perform a measurement on the
received qubit. Unconditional security is guaranteed by
the fact that the unique way to intercept information is
implementing a controlled time evolution of the qubit for
decryption causing a detectable delay in transmission.
Generally speaking, an abstract dynamical protocol
based on the free dynamics of a qubit can be physically
unfeasible, otherwise an open-loop controlled time evolu-
tion of a qubit can be designed to increase the feasibility
and robustness of such a protocol.
Appendix A. No-cloning theorem
Cloning an unknown quantum state is not possible in
general [5, 10]. Suppose the existence of a cloning ma-
chine, i.e. a composite quantum system which is de-
scribed in the Hilbert space given by the tensor product
H⊗H such that there is a unitary operator (a time evo-
lution of the total system) which allows to duplicate the
state of one subsystem. More precisely the initial state
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of the composite system is |ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψi〉, the copying pro-
cedure is given by the action of the unitary operator U :
U(|ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψi〉) = |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉, (32)
for any |ψ〉. A no-go theorem on the existence of U can
be easily proved: Consider two initial state |ψ〉, |φ〉 ∈ H
to be cloned. The copying procedure is:
U(|ψ〉 ⊗ |Ψi〉) = |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉,
U(|φ〉 ⊗ |Ψi〉) = |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉,
taking the inner product of above terms we have:
〈ψ|φ〉 = (〈ψ|φ〉)2. This equation holds if and only if
|ψ〉 = |φ〉 or 〈ψ|φ〉 = 0. Thus for a pair of general quan-
tum states there is not a copying procedure (a unitary
operator U) and a general cloning device cannot exist.
This result has a remarkable impact on quantum infor-
mation, in particular on security of quantum channels, in
fact it implies that Eve cannot gain information from un-
known qubits but she must perform measurements cor-
rupting information.
Appendix B. Derivation of equation 12
Starting from equation (11):
i~
d
dt
U0(t)UI(t) =

H0 + ∑
i=1,2
ui(t)Hi(t)

U0(t)UI(t),
i~
(
d
dt
U0(t)UI(t) + U0(t)
d
dt
UI(t)
)
=
=

H0 + ∑
i=1,2
ui(t)Hi(t)

U0(t)UI(t),
H0U0(t)UI(t) + i~U0(t)
d
dt
UI(t) =
= H0U0(t)UI(t) +

∑
i=1,2
ui(t)Hi(t)

U0(t)UI(t),
i~U0(t)
d
dt
UI(t) =

∑
i=1,2
ui(t)Hi(t)

U0(t)UI(t),
i~
d
dt
UI(t) = U
∗
0 (t)

∑
i=1,2
ui(t)Hi(t)

U0(t)UI(t),
obtaining equation (12).
Appendix C. Proof of identity 20
Given the orthonormal basis {|0〉, |1〉} of the Hilbert
space H we define an equivalence relation between state
vectors: |ψ〉 ∼ |φ〉 if and only if they differ by relative
phases w.r.t. the basis {|0〉, |1〉} then they are physically
indistinguishable by means of a measurement performed
w.r.t. this basis.
Let |ψ〉 = U0(t)UI(t)|0〉 for some t ≥ 0:
U0(t)U
∗
I (t)|ψ〉 ∼ U∗0 (t)U∗I (t)|ψ〉,
where we use the fact that free evolution operator (and
its adjoint) produce only relative phases because the
fixed basis is made by eigenstates of free Hamiltonian.
If we prove the following relation:
U∗0 (t)U
∗
I (t)|ψ〉 ∼ U∗I (t)U∗0 (t)|ψ〉 = |0〉, (33)
then identity (20) is also proved because it implies
U0(t)U
∗
I (t)|ψ〉 = eiθ|0〉 for some θ ∈ R depending on
the operator UI(t).
Consider decomposition U∗I (t)|0〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, then:
U∗0 (t)U
∗
I (t)|0〉 = αeiE0t|0〉+ βeiE1t|1〉,
U∗I (t)U
∗
0 (t)|0〉 = αeiE0t|0〉+ βeiE0t|1〉,
that is U∗0 (t)U
∗
I (t)|0〉 ∼ U∗I (t)U∗0 (t)|0〉. The same argu-
ment implies U∗0 (t)U
∗
I (t)|1〉 ∼ U∗I (t)U∗0 (t)|1〉 thus rela-
tion (33) is true by linearity.
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